has transformed the way people connect and interact with each other as well as share information. OSN have led to a tremendous explosion of network-centric data that could be harvested for better understanding of interesting phenomena such as sociological and behavioural aspects of individuals or groups. As a result, online social network service operators are compelled to publish the social network data for use by third party consumers such as researchers and advertisers. As social network data publication is vulnerable to a wide variety of reidentification and disclosure attacks, developing privacy preserving mechanisms are an active research area. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the recent developments in social networks data publishing privacy risks, attacks, and privacy-preserving techniques. We survey and present various types of privacy attacks and information exploited by adversaries to perpetrate privacy attacks on anonymized social network data. We present an in-depth survey of the state-ofthe-art privacy preserving techniques for social network data publishing, metrics for quantifying the anonymity level provided, and information loss as well as challenges and new research directions. The survey helps readers understand the threats, various privacy preserving mechanisms, and their vulnerabilities to privacy breach attacks in social network data publishing as well as observe common themes and future directions.
billion monthly and 900 million daily active users [1] . There are a variety of publically available datasets to experiment with. The skyrock social network [78] contains 31.3 × 10 6 nodes and 1.17 × 10 9 links. The Stanford Large Network Dataset Collection (SNAP) [70] and the Social Computing Data Repository [71] contain diverse datasets of varying size and from different sources. The Flickr dataset (about 12 GB) hosted on the Amazon Web Services platform is publically available for use [94] .
As the social networks popularity grew, interest in harvesting social network data has gained growing attraction as well. As a result, many online social network operators routinely publish anonymized versions of the data collected from social network service users to third party consumers such as sociologists, (e.g., for studying social structure) [2] , epidemiologists (e.g., to understand infectious disease dynamics) [3] , [4] , businesses (e.g., to drive marketing campaigns and to enable better social targeting of advertisements) [5] and criminologists (e.g., identifying insurgent networks and determining leaders and active cells) [6] .
Generally, the data collected by online social network operators is rich in content and relationships that are quite valuable to many third party consumers. As the social network data often comprises private and sensitive information about the social network users, it is imperative to ensure that any published social network data would not breach privacy of the social network users. As a result, the social network operators release sanitized version of the social network data for use by the third party consumers [7] , [9] , [12] , [19] , [69] . The basic anonymization techniques that are mainly based on replacing personal identifiable information with pseudorandom information provide no guarantee of anonymity. It has been shown that a substantial number of Twitter and Flickr users can be re-identified from the anonymized graph with little effort [34] . This shows that the basic anonymization techniques are not enough to preserve privacy of the social network users. Therefore, how to preserve social network user privacy while ensuring that the published social network data is useful to the third party consumers is a serious challenge facing the social network sites operators.
Privacy preserving social network data publishing is concerned with social network data publishing while preserving the social network users' privacy. Preserving privacy of social network data is much more challenging than the anonymization of the conventional tabular data in databases [36] , [111] . This challenge arises due to the graph data diversity and complexity. Also, an adversary can exploit a variety of global properties of a graph to carry out privacy related attacks. Moreover, two graphs that have equal number of vertices and edges can be significantly different in their global properties. These challenges have stimulated considerable interest in building privacy-preserving social network data publishing technologies and tools in recent years. As a result, a wide variety of approaches for publishing social networks data with privacy preservation have been proposed in the literature. This paper presents a comprehensive and systematic review of the recent studies on published social network data vulnerabilities, privacy attacks and privacy preserving techniques. As the research on the protection of the published social network data privacy is recently receiving a lot of attention, this study is timely and makes the following contributions:
• We present a high level social network threat analysis framework.
• We quantify and categorize a spectrum of adversarial background knowledge used by adversaries to mount privacy breach attacks on published social network data.
• We present various graph structural-based privacy attack models that are based on the adversary's resources and background information.
• We present a two-level classification of the current stateof-the-art social network data anonymization techniques.
• We present a survey of the regularly used metrics to assess the level of anonymity and preservation of the original graph structural properties provided by the anonymization techniques.
• We present some of the outstanding challenges that need to be addressed in this research space. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a detailed overview of the social network data publishing framework is presented. Privacy risks and the details of the current state of the published social network graph de-anonymization attacks are presented in Section 3. We present a coherent classification of various metrics used to measure the anonymity level and information loss due to anonymization in Section 4. The state-of-the-art anonymization techniques in privacy preserving social network data publishing is presented in Section 5. Open problems that need to be addressed in this research space is discussed in Section 6. The conclusion is discussed in Section 7.
II. SOCIAL NETWORK DATA PUBLISHING
In this section, we present social network data models and review some of the salient properties of graphs commonly used by an adversary in committing privacy-related attacks on published social network graphs. Throughout the paper, we refer to a graph and network, vertex and node as well as link and edge interchangeably. Fig. 1 shows a typical online social network environment with the key actors: online social media (e.g., Healthnet), operators (e.g., hospital), social media users (e.g., patients) and third party data recipients (e.g., researchers) and adversaries.
A. Social Network Data Platform
The online social network users use the social media services to connect and interact through personal relationships, interactions, or flows of information. Note that users may be members of several social media services (e.g., Facebook and LinkedIn) concurrently. Online social network users willingly provide detailed personal and private information that include contact information (e.g., email, phone number, and home address) relationship status, birthdate and name of the school they went to [109] .
The online social network users create profiles and exchange messages using built-in email or instant messaging. The profile contains a plethora of rich personal information that can uniquely identify them (e.g., name, email, place of current work and job titles), quasi-identifiable information (e.g., home address, educational background or former work place and title), demographic information (e.g., age and gender), as well as sensitive information that may be hidden from the public view (e.g., income, relationship status, religion, political view). There are also a rich set of data generated from the interactions between different users. This data may also include sensitive information such as user shopping habits. OSN users are increasingly using mobile devices to connect to social network further exacerbating privacy and security concerns [110] .
The social networks operators collect and store data from the service users for the purpose of sharing it with a wide variety of third party consumers such as researchers to study disease propagation and risk. A brief survey on social networks data sharing is present in [34] . As the collected data often contains sensitive information, network operators may release anonymized and sanitized versions of the complete social network graph or a subgraph to the third party users such as advertisers, marketers, sociologists, epidemiologists, and healthcare professionals. The adversaries are also assumed to have access to the published social networks data. However, unlike the third party consumers, the intent of an adversary is to re-identify certain users in the published social network data.
B. Social Network Data Model
Generally, social network data is modeled as a non-reflexive graph G = (V, E), where V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } is a set of vertices and E = e i j = v i , v j v i , v j ∈ V, i = j is the set of edges between the n vertices of graph G. Two vertices v i ∈ V and v j ∈ V are called adjacent if they share a common edge. The edge connecting v i ∈ V and v j ∈ V is said to be incident to v i ∈ V and v j ∈ V . An edge connecting a vertex to itself is called a loop. Two edges e i ∈ E and e j ∈ E connecting the same pair of vertices (and pointing in the same direction if the graph is directed) are said to be parallel edges. Graph G may be directed or undirected. For example, social network graph is modeled as a simple directed graph in [85] and as an undirected graph in [40] , [62] . If the graph is directed, an edge pointing from vertex v i ∈ V to vertex v j ∈ V is said to be incident from v i ∈ V and incident to v j ∈ V .
A graph with neither loops nor multiple edges is called a simple graph. If a graph has multiple edges but no loops then it is called a multigraph. If it has loops (and possible also multiple edges) then it is called a pseudograph. Weighted graphs where the edge weights could be used to represent information such as the degree of friendship can also be used [37] , [88] , [89] , [90] . A graph H = (V H , E H ) is said to be a subgraph of G = (V, E) graph provided that V H ⊂ V and E H ⊂ E. Graph is said to be induced graph if all of the edges that link V H ∈ G are in H .
Measures such as degree centrality (the number of direct relationships that a vertix has within the graph), betweenness centrality (the influence a vertex exerts over the interactions of other vertices in the graph) and closeness centrality (length of shortest path to all others) are widely used in network analysis. A detailed description of these measures is given in section 4. Fig. 2b shows an example of a social network (Fig. 2a) representation as an undirected graph. The graph only has vertex identity (i.e., name) and such graph is called an unlabeled graph [4] , [12] , [17] , [25] . Since unlabeled graphs do not have vertex and edge attributes and labels, adversarial information is only based on the structure of the graph itself. In the graph of Fig. 2b , the vertices represent real entities (e.g., individuals or organizations) and the edges represent relationships among the entities in the network. Each vertex has a profile that may comprise personal information such as social security number, name, demographic information, income, relationship status, etc. Vertices often have attributes such as an age of the users as shown in Fig. 2c . Such graphs are called labelled graphs as the vertex has an attribute associated with it in addition to vertex identity.
As shown in Fig. 2d , edges can also have attributes that define the properties of the relationship between the social network users. For example, an edge between two participants in the social network can reveal sexual orientation. Although an edge of a graph can be sensitive and possibly reveal confidential information, edges are often configured as public by default on most online social networks and the default settings is rarely changed by users [34] .
C. Privacy Breach Risks
A privacy breach is said to have taken place when information deemed private and sensitive is disclosed to unauthorized individuals. Generally, online social network users have strong perception that the network operators keep their private information secure [13] . To ensure privacy of the social network users, the operators commonly anonymize the data before publishing it for use by the third party consumers. However, maintaining online social networks users' privacy in publishing social network data is an increasingly important challenge facing social network operators [4] , [9] , [8] , [25] . Fig. 3 shows the transformation of the original social network graph G = (V, E) (Fig. 3a) into an anonymized versionḠ = (V ,Ē) using the naïve anonymization mechanism (Fig. 3b) . The naïve anonymization mechanism simply replaces the identity information associated with each vertex (i.e. names) with a random pseudo-identities (i.e. numbers). The advantage of the naïve anonymization is that it permits useful analysis of the published social network data. Also, for a zero knowledge adversary, the naïve anonymization can protect privacy of the individuals. However, an adversary can exploit a wide variety of structural information about the graph to re-identify individuals from the anonymized graph [13] , [75] . For example, the adversary can breach the privacy of an individual by identifying a target vertex representing the targeted individual or infer some useful information about the individual from the released data. This observation has led to three important privacy risks facing social network data publishing [17] :
(i) Identity disclosure risks -Identity disclosure occurs if a specific person can be identified from the released anonymous graph. For example, a married and successful politician being identified in a circle of criminals is devastating to the person and to his/her political career. (ii) Edge disclosure risks -Edge disclosure reveals the relationships between the social network users. For example, a patient-doctor relationship is private and must be safeguarded. This is because if a doctor is known to be an HIV specialist, the relationship disclosure can lead to the patient being identified as infected with HIV.
(iii) Content disclosure risks -Content disclosure occurs when a sensitive attributes associated with each vertex or edge such as age, gender, sexual-orientation in the released social network data is compromised and the compromised attribute can be directly attributed to a specific person in the anonymous graph. Generally, these risks can be categorized into active, semipassive and passive [13] . In active attacks, new vertices and edges are added to the social network prior to the publication. In the semi-passive attacks, only edges are added in the social network graph prior to the publication. No modifications of the social network graph is made in passive attacks prior to the release and the attack leverages auxiliary data sources [34] .
A variety of approaches to mitigate content disclosure attacks [25] , [28] and link disclosure attacks [33] , [45] , [70] have been discussed. Social network link anonymization has been discussed in [32] , [33] , [42] , [45] , [80] . Anonymization of weighted social network graphs where the edge weights could be used to represent information such as the degree of friendship is discussed in [37] , [37] , [88] , [88] . Recently approaches that provide privacy preserving services based on the user's personal privacy requests has emerged [57] , [87] . For example, Yuan et al. [87] proposed a framework to achieve personal privacy requirements considering three different conditions: the labels on the nodes, the degree of nodes, and the labels on the edges.
In this paper, we will focus on a vertex re-identification attack. Vertex re-identification attack is one of the significant and challenging problems in social network data publication [4] . This attack essentially aims to link specific vertex in published social network data to specific real individual. Once the specific vertex and real world identity is linked, all the sensitive information about the individual such as sensitive attributes or sensitive edges are considered disclosed, hence, the privacy is breached. Although a privacy-protection mechanism for social network data publishing should consider identity, attribute and link disclosure threats, identity disclosure often leads to both link and attribute disclosures. This observation has given rise to an extensive research in identity disclosure prevention mechanisms.
D. Adversary Knowledge
The aim of an adversary is to encroach on the privacy of social network service users using a variety of background knowledge. As the adversarial knowledge plays a central role in understanding the type of the attacks as well as the various protection methods, we survey and categorize them in this section.
The adversarial background knowledge refers to a specific information about the social networks users that an adversary possesses and uses to perpetrate privacy-related attacks on the published social network data. Such information can be obtained by crawling [50] or well-known web browser history stealing attacks [49] or by actively partaking in a social network sites [13] or by exploring the overlapping membership of several social network sites [34] . This information is TABLE I  AN ADVERSARY BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE (V = VERTEX, E = EDGE,  C = CALCULATED, A = ASSIGNED) commonly used to re-identify specific persons in the published social network graph. Table I shows a range of background knowledge information that may be available to an adversary to breach social network user privacy from the published graphs. The information exploited by an adversary can be generally categorized as personal attributes, structural (or topological) attributes, auxiliary attributes, edge attributes and subgraph attributes. Note that an adversary can combine these attributes together to perpetrate privacy attacks. Obtaining this information from the primary sources is relatively easy [52] . Backstrom et al. [13] demonstrated that an adversary who possess some information about a graph structure as a background knowledge can uniquely identify the vertices of a social network graph from the published social network data.
The personal attributes represent the non-structural information that describes a social network users (e.g., name, address, age, salary, marriage status, etc.). These attributes are assigned to the vertex or edge. Some of the personal attributes such as social security number act as a unique identifier. These type of personal attributes are expected to be safeguarded from being released. Other personal attributes such as name and address act as quasi-identifiers. Individually, quasi-identifiers may not be sensitive but an adversary can combine them with other information (e.g., auxiliary information) to mount sensitive information disclosure attack on the published social network data.
The auxiliary information (also referred to as external knowledge) is the information that an adversary gathers from other sources such as another social network graph which has overlapping users with the published social network graph [34] and group membership of users [49] . An auxiliary social network graph which has overlapping users with the published social network for de-anonymization is also used in [8] , [34] , [46] . It has been shown that the auxiliary information can be used for a substantial re-identification attacks even if it is very noisy [34] .
Graph information (e.g., vertex degree) [17] , [29] can help an adversary to mount privacy attacks on anonymous graphs. Naturally, the graph metrics provide insight such as how well a person is interconnected in the network as well as the relative location of the individual in the center of the network [17] , [29] . 
is the total number of vertices adjacent to the vertex v and defined as follow:
The degree of a vertex is the simplest adversarial knowledge and the easiest for an adversary to obtain. Neighborhood graph structural property is considered in [25] , [26] , [28] , [58] as the adversarial background knowledge. Given a graph G = (V, E), the neighborhood information of a vertex v ∈ V is the set of vertices adjacent to vertex v and is given as follow:
Note that the neighborhood information of a vertex v ∈ V does not include v for simple graphs with no loops or directed edges. Also, if the vertex v is connected to itself by a loop, then vertex v is considered to be its own neighbor. A neighborhood subgraph (S (u)) is a subgraph induced by a vertex u ∈ V and its neighbors N (u) ∈ V defined as follows:
where N ∈ V contains a vertex u and its neighbors (N (u)) while E is all edges whose endpoints are both in N . Fig. 4 shows the difference between the degree, neighborhood and neighborhood subgraph concepts. The degree of Gary in both Fig. 4a and Fig. 4b is three. In contrast, the neighborhood of Gary in Fig 4b is the graph with three vertices (Ann, Lee, and Ziad) as well as two edges (an edge that connects Ziad and Lee and another edge that connects Lee and Ann). The neighborhood information of Gary in Fig.4b translates to: Gary has three close friends (Ann, Lee and Ziad) and two of them (Ann and Lee or Ziad and Lee) are also close friends. In Fig. 4b , Ziad, Lee and Ann are said to be 1-hop neighbors (1-neighbour) of Gary. In contrast, Sina is 2-neighbour of Gary while Tutu is 3-neighbour of Gary. Therefore, Gary can have i-hop neighbors in a graph where i ≥ 1. Subgraph structure is another adversarial knowledge used to mount privacy attacks on anonymous graphs [13] , [15] , [30] . Given a graph G = (V, E), a subgraph (embedded or induced) is a subset of the vertices of a graph (N) together with any edges whose endpoints are both in this subset (E). An embedded subgraph includes subgraphs and special edges within the target social network [13] .
Hay et al. [21] modeled the graph structure adversarial background knowledge as structural queries Q that corresponds to:
(i) Vertex refinement queries: This is a locally expanding structural query. The vertex refinement query is formally defined as follows:
where with high degree and high betweenness centrality. The hub fingerprint query returns information regarding the juxtaposition of a vertex v to one or more hubs (i.e., vertices with high degree and high betweenness centrality) in the released social network data. The above queries model a range of graph structural features such as the degree and neighborhood of a vertex that can be exploited by adversaries.
In summary, there are a wide variety of background knowledge that an adversary can tap into to perpetrate an attack on the published social network data. However, it is virtually impossible to model all types of adversarial background knowledge [31] , [44] . Note that the type of the published graph (i.e., unlabeled graph, labelled graph and edge labelled graph) determines the use of the adversarial knowledge discussed in this section.
III. DE-ANONYMIZATION ATTACKS
Graph de-anonymization is the process of re-identifying or learning some sensitive information about an individual in an anonymized graph data. The problem addressed in social network data privacy breach attack can be informally stated as:
Problem 1: Given an anonymized versionḠ = (V ,Ē) of a social network, a target individual t ∈ V in the original graph, and an adversarial background knowledge B, the challenge for an adversary is to successfully identify or infer some useful information about t ∈ V from the published network dataset with high degree of probability.
The adversary performs the re-identification attack by searching for a vertexū ∈V Ḡ that could be mapped to t ∈ V based on the adversarial background knowledge B.
Definition 1: Let B (t) be a specific property of a target individual t ∈ V in the original graph that is known to an adversary. The adversary is said to have succeeded in reidentifying t ∈ V from the anonymized graphḠ if the following holds:
A variety of de-anonymization attack techniques that exploit various graph information such as the network structure [34] and metadata like added subgraphs [13] have been proposed in the literature. In the following subsections, we present some of the de-anonymization attack on the naïvely anonymized graph. We assume that the published social network data is G = V ,Ē shown in Fig. 3b , which is anonymized using the naïve anonymization model.
A. Degree-Based Attack Models
The degree-based attack model [12] , [17] , [20] , [24] , [69] is a modest adversarial model. The adversary is assumed to have access to a naïvely anonymized graphḠ = V ,Ē and the degree information deg (v) of a target vertex v in the original graph G = (V, E). The aim of the adversary is to use deg (v) as a background knowledge and re-identify the target vertex v from the anonymized graphḠ.
Definition 2: An adversary with vertex degree background knowledge is said to have re-identified a target vertex v ∈ V from a published social network graph iff an adversary can identify a vertexū ∈V Ḡ with high degree of probability from the anonymized graphḠ such that the degree information of vertexū exactly matches that of vertex v.
In the degree-based attack proposed in [17] , the adversary queries the anonymized graphḠ for a vertexv ∈V Ḡ with deg (v) in order to re-identify the target individual. To illustrate the degree-based attack proposed in [17] , consider the anonymized graphḠ = V ,Ē shown in Fig. 3b . Let the target individual be Gary in the original graph shown in Fig. 3a (vertex #7 in Fig. 3b) . The adversary has prior knowledge that 'deg (Gar y) = 4'. The adversary queries the anonymized graphḠ for a vertexv ∈V Ḡ with deg (v) = 4. The response to the query will bev 7 since vertex #7 is the only vertex with degree deg (v) = 4 in graphḠ The adversary knows that Gary has four friends (degree) in the original graph and vertex #7 must correspond to Gary in the original graph. Thus the adversary can uniquely re-identify Gary from the anonymized graph.
Note that the degree-based attack is possible because the structure of the graphḠ = V ,Ē is exactly identical to the original graph G = (V, E) and only the identity of the vertices are modified in the anonymized graph. Generally, the degreebased attacks assume that the target individual has unique value of a degree property within the original graph. The degree attack fails if this is not the case. For example, consider the case where an adversary knows that 'deg (Ann) = 2' and would like to re-identify Ann from the anonymized graphḠ shown in Fig. 3 . The adversary queries the anonymized graphḠ for a vertexv ∈V Ḡ with deg (v) = 2 in order to re-identify Ann. The response to the query will producev 2 ,v 4 ,v 6 . This means that an adversary with only degree information cannot uniquely re-identify individuals from the anonymized graph if the target individual does not have unique value of a degree property in the original graph.
In a friendship attack [18] , an adversary is assumed to have prior knowledge of a pair of vertices and their social connection to uniquely re-identify an individual from the anonymized graph. Specifically, let v i ∈ V and v j ∈ V be two vertices connected by an edge v i , v j ∈ E in the original graph. Also, let X and Y denote the degree of vertex v i and vertex v j respectively. In order to re-identify the target individual, an adversary queries the anonymized graphḠ for a vertexv i ∈V Ḡ where
To illustrate the friendship attack, consider the case where an adversary wants to re-identify Ann in Fig. 3b . In addition to deg (Ann) = 2, the adversary knows that Gary is a friend of Ann (i.e., Gary is directly connected to Ann) and deg (Gar y) = 4. Thus, when the adversary queries the anonymized graph G for a vertexv i ∈V Ḡ where v i ,v j ∈Ē, • (v i ) = 2 and deg v j = 4, the response to the query will bev 6 . Thus an adversary with extra friendship information of an individual can uniquely identify an individual in the network. However, the friendship attack will not uniquely identify Lee in the graph of Fig. 3b . The query for a vertexv i ∈V Ḡ where v i ,v j ∈Ē, deg (v i ) = 3 and deg v j = 4 will producev 8 andv 9 . This suggests that it is not sufficient to just protect against the friendship attack as an adversary can exploit more available information on the social network to perpetrate privacy attack.
Hay et al. [12] introduced the notion of the candidate set based on a social network graph G = (V, E) and the corresponding naively anonymized graphḠ = V ,Ē respectively. Let t ∈ V be the target individual in the network and B (t) be some background structural knowledge about node t. Then the candidate set of t is defined as
The adversary can definitely re-identify the target t ∈ V only iff |C (t)| = 1. They simulated degree attack on three real world dataset traces using three queries that modeled an adversarial background knowledge: (i) vertex refinement queries, (ii) subgraph query and (iii) hub fingerprint query.
B. Neighbourhood Attack Models
The neighborhood attacks [4] , [16] , [25] , [26] exploit the neighbors information of a target vertex v ∈ V (G) in a graph within r -hops where r ≥ 1. Thus, it is generally assumed that an adversary have prior knowledge of the neighborhood information of some target persons t ∈ V in the original graph G = (V, E). The adversary mounts a re-identification attack on an anonymized graphḠ = V ,Ē .
Definition 3: An adversary with prior knowledge of a vertex v ∈ V neighbourhood information is said to have re-identified a vertex v ∈ V (G) iff an adversary can exclusively identify a vertexū i ∈V Ḡ such that the neighbourhood information of Note that vertex v ∈ V is assumed to possess a neighborhood information that differs significantly from the rest of the vertices in the original graph.
Zhou and Pei [25] illustrated a neighborhood attack on anonymized social network graph. The adversary is assumed to have access to a naïvely anonymized graphḠ = V ,Ē , a target vertex v ∈ V (G) and a neighborhood subgraph (S (u)) of vertex v ∈ V (G). For example, in social network graph shown in Fig. 3b , Barb has two close friends who are also friends. Barb also has another close friend who does not have any other friend but Barb. As shown in Fig. 5a , no other person in Fig. 3b has the same neighborhood information as Barb. Therefore, if an adversary knows Barb's neighborhood information, then the adversary can exclusively re-identify Barb from the anonymized graph (Fig. 3b) .
The neighborhood-pair attack [7] is analogous to the friendship attack [18] in that it considers two adjacent vertices v ∈ V (G) and u ∈ V (G) in the original graph G = (V, E). The adversary is assumed to know information about the neighborhood subgraph induced by a vertex v ∈ V (G) (i.e., (S (v))) and vertex u ∈ V (G) (i.e., (S (u))). A metrics called neighborhood coefficient is proposed to capture the S (v) and S (u) properties succinctly. For example, suppose an adversary wants to re-identify Lee from the anonymized graphḠ = V ,Ē shown in Fig. 3b . The adversary knows that Lee and Gary are fiends (see Fig. 3a ) and the neighborhood information of Lee and Gary (see Fig. 5b ). Therefore, the vertex representing Lee can be identified uniquely from the anonymized graphḠ = V ,Ē since no other vertices with the same neighborhood information exists in both
In the majority of the neighborhood attacks, the adversarial background knowledge is limited to 1-neighborhood (i.e., immediate neighbors of a given vertex) information. A neighborhood attack in which the prior knowledge of an adversary extends to neighbors at i-hops distance (i.e., neighbors at iradius from a given vertex such that i ≥ 2) is discussed in [29] . In the model, the adversarial knowledge includes the degree (degr (u)) of the target vertex u ∈ V (G and the degree of its neighbors within i-hops:
where N (i, j) represents the neighbours of vertex v ∈ V (G) at 1-hop. The main problem with considering more than 1-hop is that the adversary has to collect much more information about the target vertex which are generally difficult. Also, the social network distance often tends to be relatively small [25] . 
C. Subgraph Attack Models
A variety of subgraph-based vertex re-identification attacks are discussed in the literature [13] , [15] , [16] , [61] . Note that the neighborhood attack discussed in the previous section is a special case of sub-graph attack discussed in this section.
An adversary can embed a subgraph in the original graph [13] or may learn a subgraph around the target vertex in the graph [15] , [16] , [61] . In some cases, the adversary is assumed to have prior knowledge about the complete graph and the position of the vertex of interest in the graph [31] , [35] . Fig. 6 shows an example of the subgraph attack discussed in [13] . In the model, the adversary modifies the original graph prior to its publication by embedding a small subgraph H = {h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , h 4 } in it (see the dashed square and lines in Fig. 6 ). The vertices in H are assumed to be connected with each other in such a way that the adversary can uniquely discover it from the anonymized graph. The adversary also creates a link between each h i ∈ H and w i ∈ W where W ⊆ V such that W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n } is the set of the vertices in the original graph G = (V, E) that an adversary wishes to breach their privacy.
If the anonymized social network graph is published, the adversary can discover a subgraph H by searching the anonymized graph for a subgraph that has the same degree sequence as the subgraph H . The vertices in W along their edges are also re-identified. Empirical analysis of the attack using a dataset that contains 4.4-million vertices and 77 millionedges extracted from LiveJournal.com social network shows a success rate of 90% when the number of vertices in H is 7.
The problem with this approach is that it requires an efficient construction of the subgraph to be embedded in the original graph and the recovery of the subgraph. Since finding the embedded subgraph in the published graph is an intractable problem, Backstrom et al. [13] consider subgraphs that have Hamiltonian path of their k nodes only. Also, as the link creation in most social media services require approval from the legitimate users in the network, the adversary has little control over the edge creations.
D. Network Topology Attack Models
The network topology attack models [8] , [34] , [11] represent the class of attacks that use an auxiliary social network graph and a few initial mappings (seed vertices) to mount an attack on the anonymized social network graph. The approach exploits the fact that a single person has membership on multiple social network sites to mount re-identification attacks in the anonymized network. An adversary has access to G = (V, E) (reference or auxiliary) graph andḠ = V ,Ē (anonymized target) graph. Generally, these attacks begin with known mutual vertices in the two networks (i.e., seed vertices) and then expand the number of re-identified vertices by comparing and matching in each network.
The Seed-and-Propagation attack [34] assumes an adversary with auxiliary social network graph and a seed subgraph as a background knowledge. The auxiliary social network graph and the target graph have overlapping membership and the seed subgraph is present in both the auxiliary and the target social network graphs. The algorithm runs in two phases. In the seed phase, the adversary identifies the seed vertices in both the anonymous graph and the auxiliary graph using a seed identification algorithm. Specifically, a subset of n-cliques from the auxiliary network is sampled randomly. The algorithm then determines the matching cliques in the target graph. The matching is based on the vertex degree sequence of the n vertices in the given clique and the set of the mutual neighbors between each of n 2 pairs of vertices. In the propagation step, the algorithm expands the set of re-identified seed vertices by incrementally comparing and mapping the neighbors of the previously mapped seed vertices. In this step, the rest of vertices in the auxiliary graph is iteratively matched with the targets in the anonymous graph on the basis of the known seed vertices in n 2 . Note that each iteration will re-identify a new set of vertices which will serve as seed vertices to the next iteration for further re-identification. The authors have shown that a third of Twitter and Flickr users can be re-identified from the anonymized graph with maximum error rate of 12%. Bringmann et al [11] discussed a de-anonymization attack that identifies vertices that are the same in two different networks. The algorithm computes the upper and lower bounds of the weight for the vertices based on the degree of the vertices. The algorithm uses a set of seed vertices V I containing the h highest weight. For a graph consisting of n-vertices, the algorithm uses n ε seed nodes (ε > 0) which are known to match between the two graphs. Also, the algorithm uses a signature of the vertices to check whether two nodes are identical based on their signatures. A signature S v i for a vertex v in G i is derived as:
where N i (v) is the nehgbours of vertex v and V I is the vertices that have so far been identified. The reidentification is carried out by determining vertices that have strongly overlapping signatures with the seed vertices. The authors developed criterion that help decide if two signatures originate from identical vertices with high probability. Locally sensitive hashing approach is used to decrease the number of comparisons. Theoretical and empirical analysis of the algorithm show that it runs in quasilinear time and identifies a significant fraction of the vertices.
Many of the discovered vertices do not have any common neighbors in the two social networks. The Seed-and-Grow attack [8] is similar to the attack proposed in [13] in that the adversary is assumed to have two types of prior knowledge:
(i) a social network G aux = (V aux , E aux ) with overlapping membership that share identical structure and other contents with the original graph G = (V, E); and (ii) a seed subgraph G f = V f , E f which is a small specially crafted subgraph by obtaining accounts and establishing relationships. In the seed stage, the adversary first embeds a seed subgraph G f = V f , E f by establishing a relationship with a subset of V S ⊆ V vertices in the target graph. In the grow stage, the adversary recovers G f from G, extracts V S from G f and uses it as the preliminary seed vertices for re-identifying extra vertices fromḠ. Specifically, the algorithm carries out a structurebased vertex matching between the vertices adjacent to V S and the vertices in the auxiliary graph G aux to further re-identify vertices inḠ Each newly re-identified vertices serve as the seed V S vertices and the algorithm repeats the structure-based vertex matching step betweenḠ and the auxiliary graph G aux . Empirical evaluation using the Livejournal and emailWeek datasets show that the seed-and-grow algorithm outperforms the algorithm in [34] in terms of identification effectiveness and accuracy.
As shown in this section, preserving privacy of the social network data goes beyond the naïve anonymization as an adversary could use a wide variety of information to re-identify targets. This observation has led to a proliferation of social network data anonymization techniques. Intuitively, the purpose of the privacy preserving models is to provide protection to individuals in the published social network graph from being leaked to unauthorized individuals.
IV. ANONYMITY LEVEL AND INFORMATION LOSS
Maximizing privacy of the social network users while at the same time minimizing network information loss is the main objective in privacy preserving data publishing. A variety of metrics to quantify the privacy level and the level of information loss after a graph is anonymized have been used in the literature. In this section, we review some of the common metrics used and present a coherent classification of various metrics used to measure the anonymity level and information loss due to anonymization.
A. Information Loss Metrics
In this subsection, we present various metrics used to assess the extent of information loss a graph experiences due to an anonymization process. The graph structural information loss issue can be informally stated as follows:
Problem 2: Given an original graph G = (V, E) and an anonymized versionḠ = V ,Ē , the challenge is to determine:
(i) the extent to which the structure of the original graph remains intact inḠ = V ,Ē ; or (ii) the amount of efforts needed to reconstruct the structural properties of the original graph from the anonymized graph. Generally, the utility of the anonymized graph is measured in terms of how much the structural attributes of the original graph is maintained in the anonymized graph or how much effort is needed to reconstruct the structural properties of the original graph from the anonymized graph. The standard approach to address the latter is through two step process [65] , [68] :
(i) sampling to obtain close versions of the original graph from the anonymized graph, and (ii) assess estimated values of the main properties of the original graph from the sample graphs. In [27] , various graph statistics are derived on sample graphs produced from the anonymized graph. In the rest of this subsection, we will focus on the issue of determining the extent to which the structure of the original graph remains intact.
1) Degree-Based Measures:
The aim is to determine how closer the structure of the anonymized graph is to the structure of the original graph. One possible way to achieve this is by measuring certain graph statistics of the anonymized graphs and compare it with the statistics of the original graph. Some of the vertex degree-based statistical properties of the original graph such as average degree, degree centrality, maximum degree and degree variance have been used to quantify the level of changes introduced to the original graph [15] , [16] , [18] , [30] , [65] , [68] .
The degree centrality reveals the fraction of vertices connected to a given vertex in the graph. The degree centrality of a vertex v ∈ V :
Let n be the total number of nodes in the original graph. The degree variance is one of the basic metrics of the network and defined as follows:
where C AD is the average degree of a network which is the mean value of the degrees for all vertices in the network and computed as follows:
The average degree of a graph characterizes the global properties of the network. It reflects the average connectivity of the graph. The greater value of the average degree of a graph, the more the neighbor nodes there are and the better the average connected performance is.
The maximum degree (C AD ) of a graph G = (V, E) is another measure used to quantify the level of changes to the graph and defined as follows:
The maximum degree metric can be used to measure the extent of changes to the structure of the original graph after anonymization.
2) Modified Edges Measures:
The majority of the exiting approaches employ edge addition/deletion strategy to anonymize a social network graph. Therefore, in order to assess the information loss experienced by a social network graph, the total number of the altered edges is commonly used [15] , [17] , [25] . For example, Zou et al. [15] used the difference between the original and the anonymized graph edges to assess information loss (L(G,Ḡ)):
where G = (V, E) is the original graph andḠ = V ,Ē is the anonymized version of the original graph. Note that L G,Ḡ is equal to the sum of the edges that were altered when producinḡ G = V ,Ē .
3) Shortest Path-Based Measures:
A variety of shortest path based network characteristic are commonly used in social network analysis [18] , [27] , [30] , [61] , [65] , [68] . These measures range from average path length to network diameter. The network diameter metrics assesses the maximum shortest path in the graph and defined as follows:
where dis v i , v j is the distance (length of a shortest path) between vertex v i ∈ V and vertex v j ∈ V . The average path length is the average distance G D avg that measure the minimum average number of edges between any pair of vertices. It is defined as the average of the distances between each pair of vertices in the graph:
where n > 1 is the total number of nodes in the graph and dis v i , v j is the length of a shortest path (i.e., distance) between vertex v i ∈ V and vertex v j ∈ V . The average distance measure is used in [17] , [65] . The harmonic mean distance (h) of the shortest distance is one of the topological features of networks defined as follows:
where n is the total number of nodes in the original graph and d
i, j > 0 is the geodesic distance between vertices i and j. The inverse of the harmonic mean of the shortest distance is also known as the global efficiency.
4) Vertex Level Centrality Measures:
Vertex level centrality measures such as closeness and betweenness are also used in the literature. The subgraph centrality (SC) of the network is used to quantify the centrality of vertex v based on the number of subgraphs in which the vertex is located:
where n is the total number of nodes in the graph and C B (v) represents the betweeness centrality for a vertex v.
Betweenness centrality:
The betweenness centrality, C B (v), of a vertex v ∈ V reflects the amount of influence that v ∈ V exerts over the interactions of other nodes in the network [71] . That is to say, betweenness centrality reveals how well v acts as a hub in the graph. Betweenness centrality is defined as:
where S P (u, w) is the number of shortest paths between vertices u and w and S P v (u, w) is the number of shortest paths between u and w that go through vertex v. A vertex with a high betweenness centrality normally holds a favored or powerful position in the network and has a greater amount of influence over what happens in a network. Closeness centrality: The closeness centrality, C C (v), of a vertex v ∈ V is the inverse of the shortest path distance from v ∈ V to any other vertex in the graph.
where n is the total number of nodes in the graph and d (v, u) denotes the length of a shortest-path between vertex v ∈ V and vertex u ∈ V . Note that as the value of C C (v) increases the shorter the average distance from v ∈ V to any other vertex within the graph.
5) Clustering Measures:
The clustering coefficient, CC (v), of a vertex v ∈ V is used in almost all anonymization techniques [13] , [17] , [18] , [60] , [65] . This metric quantifies the tendency of the vertices in a graph to group together and CC (v) is defined as the ratio of actual edges between vertex v's neighbors and all possible edges between its neighbors: The clustering coefficient is used in several anonymization techniques [12] , [17] . Campan and Truta [35] proposed a metric that combines an attribute and structural information loss linked to substituting an original graph by the corresponding clustered graph, as a weighted sum of two metrics:
where I D (C) represents the information loss due to generalizing of quasi-identifiers, I S (C) represents the information loss caused due to collapsing the nodes of a cluster to one super-node and w ∈ [0, 1] is a weighting parameter chosen by users.
B. Privacy Metrics
A variety of approaches ranging from probabilistic analysis to empirical study on small datasets have been used to quantify the level of anonymity that is achieved by anonymized graph. In this subsection, we review some of the approaches used for quantifying the level of anonymity of a graph. The question of the level of anonymity obtained by an anonymized graph can be informally stated as follows:
Problem 3: Given an original graph G = (V, E) and an anonymized versionḠ = V ,Ē , the challenge is to quantify the meaningful level of anonymity achieved byḠ = V ,Ē with none or little minimal loss of the original graph information.
1) Believe Probability Measures: One of the common metrics used for quantifying the level of anonymity in randomization-based anonymization techniques is by means of Bayesian a-posteriori belief probabilities. For example, privacy is determined based on the posterior belief of the adversary who had accessed the anonymized graph [12] . Therefore, Hays et al. [12] used a-posteriori belief probability to quantify the level of anonymity (I Priv ) for a vertex v as:
whereū is vertices in the anonymized graph and P (ū|v) is the belief probability thatū is the vertex v of interest. Eq. (22) states that a vertexū ∈V in the anonymized graph is mapped to the target vertex v ∈ V in the original graph. Although increasingly used, the Bayesian posterior belief is a measure that only takes into consideration the effect of local changes [68] .
2) Entropy-Based Measures: Entropy-based measures to quantify the possible anonymity level that is achieved by the random perturbation mechanisms is discussed in [27] , [68] , [65] . As opposed to the belief probabilities, entropy is a global measure that considers the whole graph. Entropy measures how much randomness is present in a graph and is defined as:
where H Sh (X ) is the Shannon entropy that provides a measure of the "uncertainty" of to an adversary and is the probability associated with vertex v i . Entropy-based metric is used in [68] to quantify the anonymity level that is provided by the perturbed graph. The authors argue that the entropy-based quantification assesses the anonymity level of an anonymized graph much more precisely than the a-posteriori belief. They also show that 'the obfuscation level quantified by means of the entropy is always no less than the one based on a-posteriori belief probabilities'. The min entropy, H min (X ), is another metric used for quantifying the anonymity level attained by the random perturbation schemes.
It quantifies the largest probability gap between the posterior and prior over all items in the input dataset.
3) K-Anonymity Measures: K-anonymity was introduced to provide privacy guarantees for databases to be released publically such that the released database is practically useful but the identity of the individuals in the database are protected [74] . Suppose we have a database D B = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n } with n records that we want to release to public for analysis. The k-anonymous property is informally defined as follows:
Definition 4 (k-anonymity property): D B is said to observe k-anonymity principle provided that each record r i ∈ D B is precisely matched to no fewer than (k − 1) ∈ D B records where 1 < k ≤ n.
K-anonymity is widely used including in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) as well as European Union Data Directive adopted [26] . Privacy in kanonymity is enforced through the process of generalization and suppression [105] :
1: Generalization process: The actual value of an attribute in the table is replaced with consistent but less precise value. For example, the original salary $45,000 in the table can be generalized to $30, 000 ≤ salar y ≤ $50, 000. 2: Suppression process: In this method, the real value of the attribute is removed from the published database. This is commonly achieved by rreplacing the actual value of an attribute by an asterisk '*'. For example, the original name = 'Stephany Townside' is represented as name = '*'. It has been proven that generating an optimal k-anonymous database under various cost measures is NP-hard [106] . As a result, several polynomial algorithms have been proposed [107] , [108] .
The principle of k-anonymity is widely used to measure the anonymity level provided by the anonymized graphs. Given a graph G = (V, E), a vertex u ∈ V is said to be k-anonymous if the following holds:
where B is the structural property of the vertices. In other words, vertex u ∈ V cannot be distinguished from at least k − 1 other vertices in G = (V, E) with respect to the structural property B. The value of k can be arbitrarily set depending on the data set, with higher values of k indicating that the data set is more resistant to privacy breaches. There are a number of definitions derived from k-anonymity tailored to structural properties of social network data. Some examples of such definitions include k-degree anonymity [35] , k-candidate anonymity [27] , k-automorphism anonymity [53] , k-neighborhood anonymity [51] , [47] , and (k,l)-grouping [13] . We will discuss below each of these derived k-anonymity concepts. Since k-anonymity and the min entropy of log2 k have identical semantics, k-anonymity based approaches are belonging to min entropy class [27] .
V. PRIVACY PRESERVING MECHANISMS
As shown in the previous section, publishing naively anonymized social graph is susceptible to a significant privacy risks. In this section, we present a review of the state-of-theart privacy preserving approaches. The problem addressed in a social network data anonymization can be framed as follows:
Problem 4: Given an original social network graph G = (V, E) and an adversarial knowledge B, construct an anonymized versionḠ = V ,Ē of the original graph such that G will enable useful analysis of the released social network data while protecting the privacy of the individuals. This is a complex problem to address and has been proved as NP-hard [25] . As a result, a wide variety of heuristics have been developed to solve this problem. Intuitively, privacy preserving approaches aim to mitigate the re-identification attacks through vertex and edge editing of the original graph such that each vertex in the anonymized graph looks the same as many other vertices to an adversary. Generally, privacy models at high level can be classified as perturbation and non-perturbation methods. The main difference between these two methods is that the nonperturbation methods uses both suppression and generalization to enforce privacy. Although the graph entities (vertices and edges) might be suppressed and generalized but never altered. In contrast, in perturbation methods, noise is injected additionally, multiplicatively, or logarithmically to alter the output. In this section, we discuss these two privacy models in detail.
We note that a brief overview of anonymization techniques is presented in [31] , [44] . The work presented in this paper complements the prior work by presenting new advances in the anonymization methods. Also, we present a two level classification of the anonymization techniques as well as various methods for measuring the utility loss and the anonymity level of the privacy preservation techniques. Table II 
A. Non-Perturbation Privacy Preservation Models
In this section, we present a two-level taxonomy of privacy preserving approaches. At the top level, we categorize the anonymization methods into four classes: random graph editing techniques, probabilistic graph editing techniques, k-anonymization techniques, and generalization by means of clustering of vertices. Since privacy preserving techniques depend on the type of attacks they are intended to mitigate, the second level of the taxonomy contains various anonymization techniques classified along the type of attacks they intend to mitigate.
1) Random Graph Editing Models:
The anonymization methods in this category edit a graph by randomly adding, deleting or switching of edges [12] , [14] , [21] , [33] , [68] . Generally, this is achieved as follows:
• Rand Modify: Select two unconnected vertices randomly and add an edge to connect them followed by selecting an edge between two connected vertices randomly and delete it.
• Rand Switch: Select a pair of edges (u, v) , (x, y) in the graph randomly and switch them to (u, x) , (x, v). A variety of approaches based on a random graph editing techniques for vertex identity anonymization have been proposed [12] , [14] , [33] . The random graph approach [21] is the simplest way to anonymize a social network data to protect it against the vertex re-identification and edge disclosure attacks. The algorithm removes n edges from the graph and adds m fake edges to the graph such that m = n. Note that the vertices in the original graph remain unchanged. Also note that the number of edges remain the same as the original graph. Moreover, the Rand Switch does not change the vertex degrees in the graph. Although the random graph editing models could possibly mitigate the re-identification attacks, they do not guarantee that the randomized graphs satisfy k-anonymity [54] . Moreover, by arbitrary modification of the edges or vertices, the strategy ignores the fact that privacy should be inclusive of all users [18] . Instead, they only provide privacy guarantees for random users.
Ying and Wu [14] argue that the approach proposed in [21] have impact on both real and spectral characteristics of a graph. The spectrum of a network corresponds to the set of eigenvalues λ i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) of an adjacency matrix derived from the graph. These eigenvalues are closely linked to several topological structures of a graph including 'diameter, the existence of consistent clusters, lengthy paths and bottlenecks, and randomness of the graph' [14] . Based on these two observations, Ying and Wu [14] proposed a spectrum preserving randomization approach referred to as Spctr Add/Del and Spctr Switch.
The main difference between Spctr Add/Del and Spctr Switch and the approach proposed in [21] is that the spectrumbased approaches take into account the possible impact that a randomly selected edge will have on the graph's spectrum. In order to maintain utility, the eigenvalues of both the adjacency matrix and the Laplacian matrix are preserved. The authors claim that the spectrum strategy achieves comparable anonymity as the approach proposed in [21] but provides better preservation of the spectral as well as many graph features. The latter is proven through performance analysis but they did not study the impact of the spectrum-based randomization on the level of privacy provided.
Bonchi et al. [68] proposed two algorithms called a random sparsification and a random perturbation.
• Random sparsification: Given G = (V, E) the algorithm selects a probability p ∈ [0, 1] and then computes an independent Bernoulli trial B e = (1 − p) for each edge e ∈ E. Edges with B e = 1 are removed from the graph while edges with B e = 0 are untouched. The modified graphḠ = V ,Ē , whereĒ = {e ∈ E|B e = 0} is published.
• Random perturbation: To transform G = (V, E) into its obfuscated form, the algorithm first removes an edge e ∈ E from G with a probability p ∈ [0, 1]. Then it adds an edge e in V 2 \E with probability:
Bonchi et al. [68] used the entropy of the probability distributions to quantify the level of anonymity. As noted in [68] , random perturbation mechanisms cannot attain significant degree of anonymity without diluting the graph features. Empirical evaluation of the random perturbation algorithm as compared against the approach in [17] using three datasets and a number of metrics showed that their algorithm achieves significant levels of obfuscation while maintain the majority of the original graph information. In terms of maintaining the characteristics of the graph at the same levels of anonymity, it has been shown that sparsification performs better than perturbation.
Anonymization of the graph using randomization techniques are unique in a sense that they are not focused on addressing specific adversarial attack. With respect to implementation, they are fairly simpler and easier than the other anonymization techniques. Moreover, a recent study showed that they may achieve meaningful levels of anonymization and preserve characteristics of the original graph [68] . This assertion was validated theoretically and an extensive experimental evaluation.
2) K-Anonymization Approaches: K-anonymization model provides anonymity through editing vertices and edges (addition / deletion) of a graph deterministically. The k-anonymization problem can be stated informally as follows:
Problem 5: Given an original graph G = (V, E) and an integer k, generate a k-anonymized version of the original graph G = V ,Ē such that an adversary with background knowledge B will not be able to re-identify a target individual with a probability greater than 1 k . A variety of k-anonymity based techniques that primarily differ in the adversarial prior knowledge have been developed to mitigate the vertex re-identification. Exiting approaches provide k-anonymity through a deterministic vertex and edge editing process. The k-degree [17] , k-automorphism [15] , k-candidate [12] , and k-isomorphic [16] are examples of vertex-labelled privacy preserving approaches that adapt the k-anonymity model. a) Degree anonymization techniques: The degree anonymization approaches are designed to counter the vertex re-identification attacks by the adversaries with prior background knowledge of the vertex degree information. The problem can be informally stated as:
Problem 6: Given a graph G = (V, E), the anonymity level (k), and the number of vertices/edges to be added (A), construct a graph with the following objectives:
(i) if edges are added, construct a graph with an ssedge setĒ over V with Ē ≤ A andḠ = V, E ∪Ē is k-anonymous. (ii) if vertices are added, construct a graph with a vertex setV over E with V ≤ A andḠ = E, V ∪V is k-anonymous. The k-degree anonymity problem is to construct a graph such that for every vertex v ∈ V in graph G = (V, E) there are at least k − 1 other vertices in G having the same degree as vertex v. One way to achieve k-degree anonymization is by transforming G = (V, E) into a k-anonymous graph G = V, E ∪Ē with only edges added to G [17] , [20] , [69] . In this case, the target optimization is to minimize the number of new edges added Ē .
Another way is to add vertices to G to constructḠ = E, V ∪V [68] . In this case, the optimization target is the number of new vertices to be embedded V . in the original graph. Also, both vertices and edges can be added to G to constructḠ = V ,Ē = V ∪V , E ∪Ē [68] . In this case, the target optimization is to minimize both V and Ē to be added in the original graph. 
Definition 5 (k-degree anonymous): A graph G = (V, E). is said to be k-degree anonymous if
∃ (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v k ) ∈ V ver- tices such that deg (v 1 ). = deg (v 2 ) = · · · = deg (v k ) in the original graph G = (V, E). Definition 6 (degree sequence): The degree sequence D = {deg (v 1 ) , deg (v 2 ) , . . . , deg (v k )} of a graph G = (V, E) is a sequence of n =V sorted integers with frequency f (deg (v i )) of each deg (v i ) ∈ D is given as follows: f (deg (v i )) = {v k ∈ V } | deg (v k ) = i(27)
Definition 6 (k-anonymous degree sequence):
The degree
is said to benonymous provided that there are at least k values of each unique number in D.
For example, D = {1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3} is 2-anonymou and D = {1, 1, 2, 2, 3} is not 2-anonymou since there is only one 3.
Lui and Terzi [17] proposed and evaluated the first kdegree anonymization heuristic. The algorithm first generates the degree sequence of the graph G = (V, E) and then transforms it to a k-anonymous degree sequence by increasing each degree to be at least equal to k. This is achieved by using a dynamic programming to produce the k-anonymous degree sequence as close to the degree sequence of G = (V, E). In the second phase, a k-degree anonymous graphḠ = V ,Ē with the anonymized degree sequence is constructed by adding edges to the original graph. In this phase, a local exchange graph-construction heuristic based on a degree sequence is used. This step attempts to introduce the minimum number of edges into the graph such that the structural similarity of the original graph and its anonymized version remains as close as possible. The average distance measure and the clustering coefficient is used to measure information loss. Fig. 7 illustrates the k-degree anonymization algorithm for k = 2. A degree sequence for graph of Fig. 7a is derived as D = {1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3}. A k-degree anonymized sequenceD = {1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3} is then generated from the degree sequence of the graph. Finally, the anonymized graphḠ = V ,Ē with an additional edge (see dotted edge in Figure 7b ) is constructed, which is 2-anonymous. An adversary querying the k-degree anonymized graph with the aim of identifying a target individual will receive at least 2 vertices with the same number of vertex degrees. For example, a degree-based query for any vertex in Fig. 7b will produce two vertices. Note that for k = 2, we require at least 2 vertices of degree 3 in the sequence. Thus, the number ofĒ. added is the minimum possible.
A lot of follow-up work that extended the work of Lui and Terzi's [17] have been presented in the literature. For example, Hartung et al. [20] discussed an improved dynamic programming algorithm for k-anonymizing the degree sequences. Lu et al. [69] proposed areedy algorithm that anonymizes the original graph by interleaving the anonymization of the degree sequence with the construction of the anonymized graph. The approach discussed in [24] employs a univariate microaggregation method to produce anonymized degree sequence and use it to alter the graph structure to make it k-degree anonymous.
A k-degree anonymization approach based on genetic algorithm is discussed in [55] . The algorithm has two steps. As in [17] , the first step generates the degree sequence for the original graph. Using the resulting degree sequence D = {deg (v 1 ) , deg (v 2 ) , . . . , deg (v k ) } from the first step, a new k-degree anonymous sequenceD that also minimizes the distance between D and the new sequenceD is computed. This is achieved by employing genetic algorithm. The mutation process handles the addition and subtraction of elements from the degree sequence. The fitness function evaluates candidates based on the current k-anonymity value, the distance between D andD, and the vertices that do not meet the desired value of k-anonymity. In the second step, an anonymized graphḠ = V ,Ē that has degree sequencesD,V = V andĒ ∩ E ≈ E is generated through the application of edge swapping approach to modify graph structure in order to implement the anonymized k-degree sequence. To compare the original and the protected graph, they aggregate the degree, closeness and betweeness values in a single parameter. They then compute an average difference between the original and the anonymized graph using the root mean square. An empirical study in comparison with a random-based anonymization technique [12] using three different data sets show that genetic-based anonymization outperforms the random-based approach by achieving a greater degree of anonymity and produces less perturbation on graphs.
The approach proposed by Chester et al. [58] achieves k-anonymity by means of vertex addition (together with incident edges) to the original graph. The algorithm inserts 'dummy 'vertices into the original graph and link them to each other and to the actual individuals in order to achieve kanonymity. Since anonymity is achieved by means of vertex addition to the original graph, the main optimization concern is minimizing the number of edges (|D|) added. The algorithm has three main steps and proceeds as follows. The first step determines a target degree for each vertex in the original graph G = (V, E). To do this, a degree sequence
Then if the elements of D are less than 2k, a single partition is used. Otherwise, the degree sequence is divided into k disjoint partitions (k-partition). This is achieved by using dynamic programming approach. Each partition will have at least k-degrees and each deg (v i ) ∈ D appears only in one partition. The algorithm then computes the maximum deficiency (md) and total deficiency (td). Then, the vertices in the graph are grouped by the degree they will have in the anonymized graph. 
Note that all the new vertices are also must be k-anonymous. Finally, new edges are added to the graph. The number of edges added between the new vertices and the exiting vertices is equal to total deficiency (td). Finally, the m vertices are added to the graph and connection is established with other vertices. Fig. 8 illustrates the anonymization approach. The degree sequence D = {3, 2, 1, 1, 1} is first created for the input graph. The k-partition of the degree sequence (3, 2) , (1,1,1) is created. Max and total deficiencies are then created to determine the number of vertices and edges to be added. The new vertex and the necessary edges are added to k-anonymized each vertex in the original graph.
The k 2 -degree anonymization [18] anonymizes a graph such that an adversary with prior knowledge of the degrees of two adjacent vertices will not be able to mount a friendship attack on the graph. A graphḠ = V ,Ē is said to be k 2 -degree anonymous provided that every vertex with an incident edge of degree pair edge (v i ) , edge v j |i = j inḠ will have at least k − 1 other vertices, such that each of the k − 1 of vertices also has an incident edge of the same degree pair [18] . In order to implement k 2 -degree anonymity, the authors propose the degree sequence anonymization (DESEAN) algorithm that consists of three main phases. The first phase is degree sequence anonymization. The first step uses dynamic programming and has three substeps. Given vertices sorted descendingly on their degrees, vertices with the same degree are clustered together, a target degree is then selected for each cluster and each cluster is made to have at least k-vertices. In the second step, edges are added/deleted as needed to ensure anonymity between the clusters. The final step adjusts the edges in the graph with the aim to ensure that all vertices within each cluster adhere to the target degree chosen in step 1. The authors analyzed the utility of the proposed approach using the degree distributions, degree centralities, clustering coefficients, average path lengths and the numbers of edge changes.
The notion of k-degree-subset-anonymization is discussed in Chester et al. [61] . The main tenet is that some vertices/ edges appeal to the adversary than others in a graph rendering the anonymizing of the entire graphs unnecessary. Chester et al. [61] studied the k-degree-subset-anonymization problem, where a subset X ⊆ V of vertices of a graph G = (V, E) are anonymized to produce a graphḠ = V, E ∪Ē . The aim to ensure that the vertices in X is k-degree-anonymous and the number of Ē edges is minimized. An algorithm based on the degree constrained subgraph satisfaction is used to ensure that all vertices in have the same degree as at least as k − 1 others while ensuring that the number of edges adds is as little as possible. GraphḠ is similar to G except that enough edges have been added to ensure all the vertices in X have the same degree as at least k − 1 others.
b) Neighbourhood anonymization techniques:
The intent of the neighborhood anonymization methods is to prevent an adversary with prior knowledge of neighbourhood information from mounting the vertex re-identification attacks. In section 3.3, we have demonstrated how the neighbourhood attacks can take place. Several approaches have been developed to mitigate neighborhood-based attacks on social network data publishing. The following definition captures the privacy requirements under the k-neighborhood anonymization.
Definition 7: A vertex v ∈ V is said to be k-anonymous in an anonymized graph provided that there are at least
Note that S (u) is a subgraph induced by a vertex u ∈ V and its neighbors N (u) ∈ V (see Eq. (3)).
Zhou and Pei [25] proposed a notion of k-neighborhood anonymization (k ≥ 1) approach that transforms an original graph G = (V, E) to an anonymized versionḠ = V ,Ē to be used for processing aggregate queries. The k-neighborhood anonymization approach is a greedy graph-modification algorithm that adds vertices and edges to the graph until such time that a graph with at least k vertices with their neighbourhood subgraphs isomorphic is constructed. This is achieved in two steps. The algorithm places the graph vertices into groups. For each v ∈ V , the algorithm extracts its neighbors S (v) and uses a technique based on the minimum depth-first-search (DFS) to represent the neighborhood subgraphs. In the second step, the vertices with similar neighborhoods are grouped together. A neighborhood component coding technique is used to speed up the comparisons and test for isomorphism of the neighborhoods of different vertices. The algorithm then anonymizes the neighborhoods of the vertices in the same group by adding vertices and edges to their neighborhoods until such time that there are k − 1 vertices with isomorphic neighborhoods as v. For quantifying utility loss, the number of edges changed during anonymization process is used as a metric. Therefore, the approach makes an effort to minimize changes to the edge set. Fig. 9 is a k-neighborhood anonymized version of the original graph G = (V, E) shown in Fig. 3 using k = 2 . Note that the aim of the k-neighborhood anonymization algorithm is to ensure that the adversary will not be able to re-identify a target individual from the k-neighborhood anonymized graph with a probability greater than 1/k. The graph satisfies k-neighborhood anonymity because there are at least k vertices with their neighborhood subgraphs isomorphic. For example, if an adversary wants to re-identify Gary from the graph of Fig. 9 , the adversary will get 2 vertices with similar neighborhood (vertex #4 and vertex #7). Therefore, the probability of successfully re-identifying Gary is guaranteed to be no more than 1/2.
Thompson and Yao [29] introduced the notion of 1-hop anonymity to address the privacy breach problem where the adversary is assumed to have prior knowledge about the degree of the target vertex and its neighbors within i-radius. They developed an intercluster matching method for anonymizinggraphs against 1-hop attacks through edge addition and deletion. The k-candidate approach [12] adds noise to the social network data through a sequence of random additions and deletions of edges. Anonymity is provided against a structural query Q that represents complete or partial structural information of a targeted individual that may be available to adversaries as follows:
Definition 8 (k-candidate anonymity vertex): A vertex v ∈ V is said to be k-candidate anonymous regarding a structure query Q if ∃ {v 1 ,v 2 , . . . ,v k } candidate vertices inv that match query Q. In other words,
Definition 9 (k-candidate anonymity graph): a graphḠ = V ,Ē is said to be k-candidate anonymous with respect to a structure query Q provided that all vertices are k-candidate anonymous with respect to the structure query Q.
The k-candidate approach [12] targets at ensuring a lower bound on the extent of uncertainty [68] . The anonymity level of a vertex v ∈ V by the perturbed graph is quantified using a-posteriori belief probability.
C) Structure-free anonymity techniques: A variety of graph structural independent anonymity models that exploit the inherent symmetry in graph are discussed in [15] , [16] , [30] . An adversary is assumed to have knowledge of any subgraph in which the targeted individual is located. The idea is to make the vertices in the graph somehow indistinguishable to an adversary by making them look structurally similar. These anonymization approaches are designed to mitigate the vertex re-identification attacks by an adversary regardless of the adversarial prior structural knowledge.
Given an original graph G = (V, E), the challenge in the k-automorphism based anonymization [15] is to construct an anonymized graphḠ = V ,Ē that confirms with the following definition:
Definition 10 (k-automorphic graph): A graphḠ = V ,Ē is said to be k-automorphic provided that the following holds for each vertex v ∈ V : [15] proposed the notion of k-automorphism to mitigate subgraph-based privacy attacks. The k-automorphc anynomization model guarantees the presence of at least kstructurally identical subgraphs in the published graph. The approach constructs a graph in which each vertex v ∈ V is automorphic to at least v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v k−1 other vertices in the graph. This is achieved by the process of alignment of sub-graphs and addition of edges in the graph. The approach partitions the original graph into a set of unique subgraphs such that: (i) each partition contains at least k-subgraphs, and (ii) no subgraphs share a vertex.
In the block alignment phase, a series of edge addition/deletion process is carried out until such time that the subgraphs within each group is isomorphic to each other. Finally, in the edge copy phase, the edges across the subgraphs are copied properly. A greedy algorithm is used to minimize the number of Ē added such that the utility of the graph is preserved. Zou et al. [15] showed that a k-automorphism graph is able to guarantee privacy under any structural attack. Privacy level attained is measured by k-automorphism, which requires the anonymized graph to have at least k-1 automorphism functions such that each function maps every vertex to a different other vertex. For quantifying information loss, an anonymization cost defined below is used:
where E (G) is the set of edges in G. The lower Cost G,Ḡ is an indication of fewer changes to the original graph G. Also statistical network measures that include degree difference, average shortest-paths and cluster coefficient are used to evaluate the utility of released graph. An adversary searching for a specific vertex through a subgraph query in k-automorphic graph should receive at least k different subgraphs inḠ = V ,Ē that match the subgraph query of the adversary. Fig. 10 illustrates the output graph of anonymization by k-automorphism method from the original graph G = (V, E) (Fig. 3) . For example, v 4 and v 7 in Fig. 10 are automorphically equivalent vertices. Therefore, v 4 and v 7 are structurally indistinguishable from each other. Another merit of k-automorphism is that it guarantees privacy under any structural attack. For example, deg (v 5 ) = deg (v 1 ) = 3, which shows that the graph in Fig. 10 is 2 Fig. 10 is also 2-neigbour anonymous. The disadvantage, however, is that in order to make a graph symmetric for anonymization, adding new vertices and modifying the edges may be required. For some applications [18] , this will reduce the utility of the published graph. Wu et al. [30] introduced the notion of k-symmetry which also assumes that the adversary has prior knowledge of any subgraph that contains the individual of interest. The challenge addressed in [30] is to construct an anonymized graphḠ = V ,Ē from an original graph G = (V, E) such thatḠ is kautomorphic graph. Extra vertices and edges would be added to transform the original graph into the corresponding anonymized graph. The k-symmetric solution is based on the automorphism partition [15] that aims for subgraph level anonymity. The algorithm ensures that every vertex in the published graph has at least k − 1 automorphically-equivalent vertices to it.
Definiton 11 (k-symmetry vertex):
A vertex v ∈ V in a graph is said to be k-symmetric anonymous provided that there are at least k − 1 automorphically-equivalent vertices to it in the graph.
Automophism equivalence is an equivalence relation on vertices V of a graph G = (V, E) . An Orb (G) is defined as the automorphism partition of G, which is a partition of V induced by automophism equivalence relation. In order to ensure that every vertex v ∈ V in the published graph has at least k − 1 automorphically-equivalent vertices to it, they use vertices/edges addition strategy which they call orbit copy to derive an anonymized graph from the original graph. Fig. 11 illustrates k-symmetry (k = 2) anonymized graph shown in Fig. 3 . The k-symmetry approach guarantees that the probability of a successful re-identification is no more than 1/k. The k-symmetric utility is analyzed via sampling method to approximate the statistical properties of the original graph (e.g., shortest path length).
Cheng et al. [16] expanded on the concept proposed in [15] by making the anonymized graph k-isomorphic as define below:
. . , g k }, such that g i ∈ G and g j ∈ G are pairwise isomorphic where i = j.
The k-isomorphism approach anonymizes a graph by creating k pairwise isomorphic subgraphs and publish them. In order to make a subgraph isomorphic, the algorithm may need to add vertices. However, determining if different subgraphs in the graph are isomorphic is an expensive process.
3) Clustering-Based Approaches: Rather than modifying the graph structure as done in k-anonymity and randomization approaches, clustering strategy [12] , [35] abstracts the graph into super-vertices and super-edges to mitigate vertex re-identification attack. The cluster-based anonymization problem can be stated informally as follows:
Problem 7: Given an original graph G = (V, E), partition the V vertices and E edges into a minimum number of superclusters while maintaining the structural information such that any pair of vertices are indistinguishable from each other.
Given an original graph G = (V, E), the underlying principle of the clustering approach is to split the V vertices into disjoint set of C = {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n } clusters:
In the first step, the vertices are partitioned in such a way that a super-cluster contains a subset of at least k vertices along their edge with similar features such as degree or isomorphic neighborhood. In the second step, cluster and edge generalization is performed to render vertices indistinguishable based on their relationships. Clusters are generalized to super-clusters. The super-cluster may be linked by super-edges. Edges are classified as internal edges (inE) and external edges (exE). Each cluster C i ∈ C is described by the intra-cluster generalization tuple C i = |cv|, |in E| where |cv| represents the number of vertices in the cluster and |in E| represents the number of edges that connect the |cv| vertices in the cluster. The edges connecting a pair of vertices in different clusters C i ∈ C and C j ∈ C are referred to as inter-cluster edges and generalized into one single super-edge (|ex E|).
Definition 13: Given an original graph G = (V, E), an anonymized graphḠ = V ,Ē is said to be k-anonymous iff |cv| ≥ 1 for C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n .
Hay et al. [12] proposed a clustering-based anonymization approach for a simple unlabeled graph. A simulated annealing is used to search for the approximate optimal clusters in [12] . In order to measure the utility loss, Hay et al. [12] used a suite of graph attributes such as connectedness, shortest path lengths and maximum degree. The case in which the vertices have attributes (e.g., demographic information) is considered in Campan and Truta [35] . A batch-based greedy approach that iteratively generalizes graph vertices is used in [35] . In every iteration, a seed vertex is selected and a new super-cluster is created with a seed vertex in it. Then the algorithm selects, based on attributes and neighborhood similarity, k − 1 other vertices and add them to the super-cluster. This process continues until such time that the entire graph is anonymized.
Tassa and Cohen [63] consider the same case as [35] and propose a sequential clustering algorithm to anonymize a graph with higher utility than [35] . The algorithm begins with partitioning the vertices into n/α · k clusters randomly, where n is the number of vertices in the graph, k is an integer and α is a parameter that is set by the user. The algorithm goes over the n vertices in a cyclic manner and moves verities from one cluster to the most appropriate cluster that would possibly minimize information loss. Fig. 12 shows an example where a graph G = (V, E) is partitioned into three super-clusters (A, B and C) with k = 2. If Although this method resists vertex re-identification attack, finding globally optimal partition of the graph is an intractable problem. Moreover, legitimate analysts of the published graph do not know the structural information in the super-clusters. This requires the analyst to sample a graph from all likely clusters, which inevitably leads to sampling errors. As the clustering-based approaches only publish the clustered graph with super vertices and edges, the utility of the original network is significantly reduced.
4) Probabilistic Privacy Preservation Models:
Probabilistic privacy preservation techniques [27] , [65] , [68] are the most recent class of graph anonymization methods. These methods convert deterministic graph into an uncertain graph by leveraging the semantics of edge probability. The probabilistic privacy preservation problem can be stated informally as follows:
Problem 8: Given an original deterministic graph G = (V, E), generate an uncertain versionḠ = U = V,Ē such that an adversary with a background knowledge B will not be able to re-identify a target vertex or infer any sensitive information fromḠ.
A variety of approaches have been developed to address the above problem. In this section, we review some of the recent once. Bonchi et al. [68] proposed the k-obfuscation privacy model to guarantee that an adversary cannot infer a vertex identity in the perturbed graph based on the vertex of its original graph. Given an original graph G = (V, E) and an integer k, the k-obfuscation produces a perturbed graph G = U = V,Ē . K -obfuscation is defined by means of the entropy of the probability distributions that are induced on the vertices of the perturbed graph. Also, it uses the random sparsification discussed in section 5.1.1 to generate the obfuscated graph. A perturbed graphḠ = U = V,Ē is said to observe k-obfuscation provided that for every vertex v ∈ V , the entropy of the random variable H v that denotes the probability thatū is the image of v inḠ overV is at least log 2 k.
The privacy level provided by k-obfuscation is quantified through the entropy of the probability distribution that is induced on the vertices of the perturbed graph is used. The k-obfuscation was evaluated using dblp, flickr, and Y360 datasets. Through various graph statistics such as clustering coefficient, average distance and the diameter, it is shown that k-obfuscation leave the structure of the original graph intact to a large extent for some given values of probability p. Also, the authors show that the extent of the anonymization (measured by entropy) provided by k-obfuscation is always larger than the anonymization level measured by probability.
A (k, ε)-obfuscation [65] is one of the methods proposed to tackle this problem where k ≥ 1 denotes the preferred level of anonymization and ε ≥ 0 is the parameter for tolerance. A possible uncertain graph of an original graph (Fig. 13a) is shown in Fig 7b. Given an original graph G = (V, E) and an integer k ≥ 1, the original graph G is transformed into a k-anonymous graph G = V ,Ē by adding or removing edges, which in turn gets transformed into an uncertain graphḠ = U = V,Ē, p by adding probability of existence P (e) = [0, 1] to each edge e of the k-anonymous graph. The resulting uncertain graph must satisfy the following privacy definitions [65] :
Definition 14: The uncertain graphḠ is said to k-obfuscate v ∈ V (G) in regards to P provided that the following holds:
Definition 15: An uncertain graphḠ is said to be (k, ε)-obfuscated provided thatḠ k-obfuscates at least (1 − ε) n vertices in G relative to P.
where Y P(v) and H Y P(v) denote the distribution and an entropy of the distribution over the vertices ofḠ. The vertex v ∈ V is a target vertex in the original graph and P is the property (e.g., vertex degree) of the vertex. The distribution Y P(v) is determined for each vertex v ∈V Ḡ having B ∈ P as follows:
Where X v (B) is the probability that v ∈V Ḡ is a vertex from the original graph G = (V, E). A sampling method is used to extract approximate versions of the original graph from the anonymized graph so that statistical properties of the original graph could be assessed. The privacy level provided by (k, ε)-obfuscation is quantified through the entropy of the probability distribution that is induced on the vertices of the perturbed graph is used. The Variance Maximizing (MaxVar) anonymization approach [27] is an improvement over (k, ε)-obfuscation [65] . One of the weaknesses of the (k, ε)-obfuscation approach is the minimum standard deviation parameter used which leads to low anonymity. The MaxVar approach is based on edge uncertainty and composed of three phases. First, the original graph G = (V, E) is partitioned into S = {g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g k } subgraphs. Each subgraph g i ∈ S is expected to contain n s = n P / |S| potential edges that connect nearby vertices where n P is the number of potential edges to be added to the perturbed graph.
Optimization is performed to make the S subgraphs as equally sized as possible and minimize the inter-subgraph edges. In the second phase, an uncertain subgraphs g i ∈ S for each subgraph with maximum edge variance is constructed. This is achieved by formulating and solving for each g i ∈ S a quadratic program under the constraint that the vertex degrees remain unchanged. The last step is to merge the uncertain subgraphs g i ∈ S|1 ≤ i ≤ |S| into the final uncertain graphḠ to be published. The authors demonstrate the effectiveness of MaxVar experimentally using a co-authorship network (dblp), a product co-purchasing network (amazon) and a video sharing web site namely a youtube. The authors use the sum of re-identification probabilities of all vertices in the graph in order to quantify the privacy of an anonymized graph. For utility measurement, degree-based, shortest path based and clustering-based measures were used.
B. Differential Privacy Model
All privacy preserving social network data publishing methods discussed so far are vulnerable to privacy attacks based on the attacker background knowledge. In this section, we introduces an alternative privacy preserving data publishing method called differential privacy.
1) Differential Privacy: Differential privacy is a privacy preservation model initially developed for use on tabular data to offer strong privacy guarantees without depending on an adversary's background knowledge, computational power or subsequent behavior [83] , [85] , [95] . The underlying principle of differential privacy is that given two databases D andD such that D ⊂D and their relative complement, D\D = {r } (i.e., D andD differ only by a single record), the probability distribution on the results of D andD under differential privacy will be "essentially the same" [83] . This differential privacy is commonly known as -differential privacy [83] where parameter controls the privacy guarantee such that the smaller the value of the stronger privacy guarantee provided by a -differential privacy algorithm.
Essentially, -differential privacy guarantees that any record in the database has insignificant influence on the published results by a -differential privacy algorithm. Therefore, regardless of the background knowledge about the database and access to all outputs returned to the queries, an adversary will not be able to infer the presence or absence of record r in the database. It has been shown that -differential privacy would lead to unacceptably low data utility in certain data analysis situations [104] . The ( , δ)-differential privacy [93] is an extension of the -differential privacy that allows privacy breaches to occur with a very small probability controlled by parameter δ.
Differential privacy relies on some form of query and result perturbation in order to provide privacy guarantees. One way that the privacy guarantees is achieved in differentially privacy is by introducing random noise to the query output. This is realized by using methods such as Laplace distribution [83] and normal distribution [101] with variance depending on and the query's sensitivity. The global sensitivity of a queryuantifies the maximum difference in the response to q over all pairs of datasets [83] . Global sensitivity provides the maximum amount of noise that needs to be introduced in to the real response to the query in order to guarantee privacy. However, certain types of queries can produce quite high global sensitivity. This necessitated the development of smooth sensitivity notion to decrease the amount of noise that has to be introduced while still maintaining differential privacy [93] . Blocki et el. [92] introduced the notion of restricted sensitivity to further improve accuracy in differentially private data analysis. Rather than quantifying over all possible datasets as is done in the global sensitivity approach, the restricted sensitivity quantifies over a restricted class of datasets.
The possibility of differential privacy to enable third party entities to perform complex analysis on social network data without being able to infer any private information about the OSN users is a hot topic. A variety of common social network analysis such as clustering analysis for identifying online communities and node influence analysis for recognizing the influential nodes have been applied to OSNs data [99] , [100] . Graph statistics such as the number of edges, counts of small subgraphs [91] , centrality measures, degree distribution [84] , [91] , cut sizes [81] and the number of triangles [91] , [93] have also been investigated.
In social network data publishing, the goal of the differential privacy is to guarantee that an adversary in possession of the published result will not be able to determine that a person x appears in G = (V, E) or a person x ∈ V and a person y ∈ V are friends in the original graph G = (V, E). Fig. 14 illustrates the two common schemes for releasing social network data with differential privacy guarantees.
In the first approach known as interactive setting (Fig. 14a) , the interested third party users pose queries to the OSN operator. The operator uses an algorithm A which is -differentially private to release the requested information. Algorithm A can modify the query or the response to the query in order to protect the privacy of the OSN users. Given a possible output (released data) O A of A on two databases D andD that are subset of each other but differ utmost by a single record, algorithm A is said to be -differentially private provided that the following holds: 
Eq (34) states that the ratio between the probability that A outputs O A on database D and the probability that A outputs O A onD is bounded by a constant. Essentially, A ensures that the probability of any output O A from database D and databasē D is equally likely thus guaranteeing that all outputs are insensitive to any individual's data. In other words, an individual's privacy is not at risk because of her participation in the social network.
In the second approach known as non-interactive setting (Fig. 14b) , the original data is not used to answer queries. Instead the social network operator computes and releases useful statistics about the social network data in the form of a summary or synthetic database under differential privacy. The released summary or synthetic database is tailored to answer queries of a certain type. Interested third party users can perform serious analysis such as estimating the distance between OSN users over the released social network statistical summary or synthetic database without being able to deduce any private information about the OSN users.
2) Differentially Private Data Analysis of Social Networks: Many efforts have been made towards differential private publication of social network data in recent days. Various algorithms that satisfy the definition of differential privacy have been developed to release statistics about social networks data. Exiting differential privacy for social network data publishing can be generally categorised into node privacy [91] and edge privacy [85] methods. In the following subsections, we will discuss the node level privacy and the edge level privacy categories in detail.
3) Node Level Differential Privacy: The aim of the node level differential privacy is to limit inference about the existence of a person in a given social network. Node differential privacy provides protection to the nodes as well as to their adjacent edges.
Definition 16 (node neighbors): Two graphs G andḠ are said to be neighbors if G can be obtained fromḠ or vice versa by adding or deleting a node and its adjacent edges. Fig. 15 shows an example of neigbouring graphs where a new node is added to the original graph (Fig. 15b) , an existing node together with its adjacent edges are removed from the original graph (Fig. 15c) .
Definition 17 ( -node differentially private): For any pair of neighbouring social network graphs G andḠ and for any sets S ⊆ Range (A) of possible outcomes produced by A, an algorithm A is -node differentially private provided that A satisfies the following [95] :
where is a small positive value set by the OSN operator to control the trade-off between privacy and accuracy and the probability Pr is computed over the random coin tosses of the algorithm. Intuitively, an adversary has a very limited ability to distinguish between the output of A (G) and the output of A Ḡ . Thus, differential privacy model suggest that the addition or deletion of any single node will not significantly disturb the output distribution of data analysis [91] . This means, graph G and G will produce similar distributions over the statistics released. Note that each person's information on the graph corresponds to a specific node and all edges adjacent to the node. Therefore, both the node and its adjacent edges should be kept concealed.
A variety of approaches have been proposed to achieve node differential privacy. Hay et al. [84] introduced the notion of differential node privacy and draw attention to some of the difficulties in attaining it. Raskhodnikova and Smith [98] discuss a node-differential privacy algorithm for releasing an approximation to the degree distribution of a graph. The algorithm is based on Lipschitz extension and the generalized exponential mechanism. Similarly, Borgs et al. [103] employ the Lipschitz extension method coupled with the exponential mechanism to introduce node differentially private algorithm.
Kasiviswanathan et al [91] discussed several differentially node-private algorithms. They also discussed approaches for analyzing the accuracy of the proposed algorithms on real networks. They also discuss Lipschitz extensions using linear programs for functions such as subgraph counting. They define a relaxed mapping for which a linear program needs to be solved to obtain the output. To address the shortcomings due to Lipschitz extensions, Kasiviswanathan et al. [91] introduced projection functions. The central idea behind their approaches is to project the input graph onto the set of graphs with maximum degree below a certain threshold. Any node in the input graph with a degree higher than the threshold is discarded. The second method introduced a projection function called naive truncation, which simply discards high-degree nodes in the graph. The local sensitivity of the projection is bound in terms of the number of vertices having predefined degrees in the graph.
Blocki et al. [12] propose node-level differential private algorithms for analyzing sparse graphs. They use low-sensitivity projections onto the set of low-degree graphs of a given maximum degree along with a smooth upper bound on its local sensitivity. The local sensitivity of the projection is bound in terms of the structure of the input graph in terms of the graph's distance to S. A projection functions is introduced to augment the weaknesses of the Lipschitz extensions. However, a linear program is required to compute the projection of the input graph.
4) Edge Level Differential Privacy:
As edge privacy is a weaker notion than the node privacy [91] , it has been studied more extensively than the node level differential privacy. Intuitively, edge privacy corresponds to a requirement that the presence or absence of the edges should be concealed, but the overall relationship pattern may be set public.
Definition 18 (edge neighbors): Two graphs G andḠ are said to be edge neighbors if one can be obtained from the other by adding or removing a link connecting two vertices. Figure 16 shows a graph with a single edge privacy where a new edge is added to the original graph (Fig 16b) and the case where an existing edge between node 0 and node 5 is deleted (Fig 16c) .
Given pairs of graphs G = (V, E) andḠ = V ,Ē , a privatized query Q satisfies edge level privacy if it satisfies differential privacy for all pairs of graphs G andḠ for some x ∈ V such that [96] :
• V =V •Ē = E − E x : |E x | = k Therefore, edge differential privacy ensures that the output of an algorithm does not disclose the presence or absence of a particular edge in the graph.
Hay et al. [84] proposed a differentially edge-private algorithm for releasing the degree distribution of a social network graph. Their algorithm is an extension of the global sensitivity approach proposed in [83] with a post-processing method on the differentially private output for removing some of the noise. Through experiential analysis on actual and synthetic networks, Hay et al. [84] show that the degree distribution estimate shows low bias and variance. They recommend it for use to analysis common network distributions such as power-law distributions. However, the method proposed in Hay et al. [84] does not publish the graph. In some cases, the structural properties of the network data are of great interest and publishing the anonymized graph is preferable. Also, the approach can only deliver approximate estimates of the degree distributions.
Nissim et al. [93] consider differential edge privacy for the case of estimating the cost of the minimum spanning tree and the number of triangles in a graph. They defined the local sensitivity of a query at a particular data set to be the amount by which the query answer can change if an edge is added to or removed from the graph. The amount of random noise that the mechanism adds to is calibrated to a more local variant of sensitivity, called smooth sensitivity. Nissim et al. [93] also discussed algorithms for computing the smooth sensitivity of statistics in a variety of domains.
Blocki et al. [92] propose an algorithm for analyzing graph data with an edge-level differential privacy. In the edge adjacency, it is assumed that adjacent graphs differ in just one edge or in the attributes of just one vertex. As an alternative to global sensitivity [83] and smooth sensitivity [93] , they introduced the notion of restricted sensitivity to reduce the amount of noise added to the output and thus improve differentially private data analysis accuracy. For edge-level differential privacy, Blocki et al. [92] provide a very simple projection operator that has constant edge sensitivity. In another work, Blocki et al [81] apply the Johnson-Linden Strauss transform to approximating cut-queries in a graph. They show that the Johnson-Linden Strauss transform allows publishing a graph that preserves edge differential privacy.
Rastogi et al. [85] focused on edge differential privacy for the case of general subgraph counts release against Bayesian adversary. They calculate a high probability upper bound on the local sensitivity first and then add noise to the data proportional to the computed upper bound local sensitivity. The proposed approach is mainly based on the assumption that the presence of an edge does not necessarily make the presence of other edges more likely. This assumption contradicts with positive correlations between edges in social networks (e.g., two people who have a common friend are more likely to be friends). Also, the assumptions about an adversary's prior knowledge restricts the applicability of a privacy definition.
VI. OPEN PROBLEMS
Privacy preserving for social network data publication is an active area of research with many challenges remaining to be addressed. In this section, we present some of the open problems.
Research trends in privacy-aware social network data publishing have been focusing on providing mechanisms to counter vertex re-identification attacks. However, there is still lacking in providing unified privacy measurement to quantify the amount of privacy gained. Also, privacy mechanisms for content disclosure attacks are generally under study. As attributes are important in many social network data analyses, privacy preserving approaches for attributed networks deserve more study. Moreover, scalability remains an issue as current approaches are commonly based on solving combinatorial problem. Therefore, research in scalable approaches is needed to handle the humongous size of the social network data.
Existing works make implicit assumption that the network is static. In practice, social network environment is dynamic, which means that some structural attributes will change dynamically. Therefore, an approach that takes into account the dynamicity of the social network environment, especially in the space of the adversary background knowledge is an open problem. Moreover, the background knowledge used by an adversary is implicitly assumed to be precise. In practice, the information available to an adversary may be noisy and vague. This raises an open question of how effective an adversary attack would be using noisy and vague knowledge. Further study is needed to address the challenging problem to analyze the attack models and the anonymization models on large-scale practical datasets. The current mechanisms have been evaluated on small, simulated networks whose characteristics are different from real social networks.
In addition, although there are preliminary work that shows data from another source such as another social network with overlapping membership can be used to mount identity reidentification attacks [34] , this observation has raised a number of questions that need to be addressed. First, there should be study to determine the optimal membership overlapping for optimal level re-identification. As the published graph and the auxiliary graph are disparate, another research direction is to develop efficient approaches that enable matching the information across the two resources as well as a way of scoring or ranking the matching.
Last but not least, the best way to formulate the notion of differential privacy in the context of social network is still an open problem. The node differential privacy provides a very strong guarantee. However, it may not provide an answer to all fears of privacy breach in a social network [91] . This issue needs to be addressed to advance differential privacy to handle this concern. Since different types of analyses are sensitive to different level of errors, another line of research on the differential privacy is how to minimize the amount of noise added to query and results to comply with requirements of the differential privacy. As noted by Kifer and Machanavajjhala, the effectiveness of differential privacy for highly correlated records is limited, suggesting that a stronger privacy protection model for datasets with highly correlated records is needed. The majority of the exiting research on differential privacy concentrates on the interactive setting while the non-interactive setting has received very little attention.
VII. CONCLUSION
Social networks operators are increasingly publishing and sharing social network data with third party consumers. The published social network data contains potentially sensitive information about users and their relationships. Recent works have shown that de-anonymization of the released data is not only possible but also practical. This has prompted privacy concerns and active research in privacy preserving mechanisms. In this paper, we presented a high level framework for social network publishing threat analysis. We also presented the threat model and quantified and classified the background knowledge that is potentially used by adversaries to breach privacy of the published social network data. We also presented a number of methods, approaches, strategies and techniques in privacy-preserving social network data publishing. In conclusion, privacy-preserving publishing of social networks remains a challenging problem, since graph problems are typically difficult and there can be many different ways for an adversary to exploit both internal and external information to mount attacks. As differential privacy has recently received attention in social network data privacy preserving research, we also provided state-of-the-art review of the work related to the differential privacy for social network.
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